McDonald's: It's a family, it's a team. It's definitely
not a union shop. Pascal McDuff found that out the
hard
way
By
Konrad Yakabuski
Report on Business Magazine
September 2001
Every family has its values. The "McFamily," the
1.5 million mostly teenaged people who work under the
Golden Arches around the world, are reminded of their
employer's values from their first moments on the job.
The McDonald's code of conduct is embodied in a series
of pithy quotes attributed to founder Ray Kroc, many
of which are tacked to staff bulletin boards and routinely
repeated by managers at the fast-food behemoth's almost
29,000 worldwide outlets. One Krocism stands out: "None
of us is as good as all of us."
Taken on its own, the expression seems a straightforward
appeal to team spirit. But for the hundreds of ex-McFamily
members who, in the past decade, have fought to unionize
at least a dozen McDonald's restaurants in Canada,
it has come to symbolize the chain's zero-tolerance
attitude toward dissent. Many of those who led the
union drives in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia
say they were made to feel selfish, like spoilers ruining
a good thing for other, more obedient employees. They
recall being passed over for raises and promotions,
excluded from all-expenses-paid outings and reduced
to fewer and fewer hours, more often than not during
the dreaded closing shift. In short, they were made
to feel they were no longer wanted or valued. They
became the family's black sheep.
Pascal McDuff and Maxime Cromp did not intend to become
the latest McCasualties when they launched an attempt
to unionize their McDonald's outlet on Montreal's bustling
Peel Street in the summer of 2000. The duo, now both
19, were undaunted by the failure of those who had
gone before them. They took on a mission to establish
better working conditions for themselves and their
40-odd co-workers -- to improve on the low pay and
paltry raises, the arbitrary schedule changes, the
favouritism displayed by managers toward some employees,
the harsh discipline and harassment experienced by
others. More than anything, they sought to empower
their generation. "Young people don't have a lot
of job options. There's McDonald's, Harvey's, Burger
King and maybe a supermarket," says McDuff. "The
kids who tried [to unionize] before us were courageous.
I felt called to their cause."
The job ladder at a typical McDonald's has seven rungs,
from lowly crew worker to store manager. In between
are crew trainers, crew chiefs, swing managers, first
assistant managers and second assistant managers. Employees
at each level exert authority over all ranks below
them. McDuff was hired as a part-time crew worker in
the spring of 1998. He was two months shy of his 16th
birthday and needed extra money to help pay for the
studies he would be undertaking at one of Quebec's
CÉGEP community colleges. He started at $6.80
an hour, then Quebec's minimum wage. Cromp, also attending
CÉGEP, joined the outlet a year later at 16.
Raises were not automatic with seniority, but granted
at the discretion of the manager. McDuff learned that
firsthand. After his first six months, he'd been limited
to a meagre 10-cent raise. After a year on the job,
he was earning 20 cents more than the minimum wage
-- less than the starting salary at a unionized fast-food
restaurant nearby.
As much as the low wages, rigid in-store hierarchy
and sometimes unpleasant tasks could be vexing, McDuff
and Cromp grew to loathe most the climate of their
workplace. Like all new McDonald's workers, the two
were given the same employee manual when they joined.
It's loaded with Krocisms like this one: "Press
on. Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence.
Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful
men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius
is almost a proverb. Education alone will not; the
world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and
determination alone are omnipotent." Kroc's folksy
advice gives only a hint of his disdain for the educated
classes. He had been a high- school dropout and milkshake-mixer
salesman before founding the McDonald's chain in 1955.
As far as McDuff and Cromp were concerned, Kroc's anti-intellectual
bent was alive and well in the modern McDonald's family.
Teenage employees often found themselves scheduled
to work the closing shift on school nights, even during
exams. "Education was never a priority at McDonald's," McDuff
says. "We were supposed to have ketchup in our
veins."
"I've had a look at what business schools do...They
can't teach the kind of instinctual response and reliance
on gut feelings that some people are lucky to learn
at a young age." - McDonald's Restaurants of Canada
senior chairman George Cohon.
McDonald's version of higher learning is practised
at the Chicago-based training facility Hamburger University.
HU's Canadian affiliate, with "campuses" in
Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, is called the Institute
of Hamburgerology. The thousands of managers, executives
and franchisees who graduate from HU's two-week course
each year are schooled mostly in the McCulture that
Kroc proudly begat. It's easy to see why George Cohon
and Kroc hit it off. Of his business rivals, Kroc once
said: "If they were drowning, I would put a hose
in their mouth." Cohon's 1997 memoir, To Russia
with Fries, echoes the sentiment. "Would I hold
back if we had one of our chief competitors on the
ropes?" he asks. "Not a chance."
Although a lawyer by training, Cohon, who grew up
on Chicago's rough-and-tumble South Side, is also a
graduate of the school of hard knocks. A bully's victim
in elementary school, he got his revenge years later
in high school, by which time Cohon had outgrown his
nemesis. Spotting the bully one day sipping water in
the hallway, Cohon stepped up and bashed his teeth
into the fountain. A few years later, as an army recruit
in basic training, Cohon got back at his anti-Semitic
drill sergeant by breaking three of his fingers. "Let
bygones be bygones?" Cohon asks. "That's
not the way things were when I was growing up. That's
not the way I am, even today."
Cohon's tough-guy approach worked wonders at McDonald's
Canadian arm. Soon after Kroc sold Cohon the exclusive
rights to open McDonald's outlets in Eastern Canada
in 1968 for $70,000 (U.S.), he offered to buy them
back for a cool million, figuring he had underestimated
the potential of what he had thought was just frozen
wasteland. Cohon held out for a better offer and, in
1971, sold out for several times more than what Kroc
had originally offered. Cohon became the company's
second-biggest shareholder after Kroc. The latter put
Cohon in charge of the entire Canadian operation after
buying out Western Canadian franchisee George Tidball
the same year. By 1993, years after Cohon had become
a Canadian citizen and just before he stepped down
as CEO, McDonald's 674 Canadian outlets recorded average
sales of $2.3 million, 15% more than the chain's worldwide
average and the highest of any major McDonald's national
unit. Although McDonald's no longer breaks out the
Canadian bottom line separately (Canada is lumped in
with the Middle East and Africa), it appears to remain
a bright spot, helping to offset the bleeding McDonald's
has suffered in Europe thanks to the mad-cow scare.
Last year, sales at McDonald's 1,154 Canadian outlets
totalled $2.14 billion, up 8% from 1999. For this year,
McDonald's first-quarter financial report trumpets "positive
comparable sales and expansion for Canada."
As left-leaning young Quebeckers, McDuff and Cromp
never quite felt at home in the McFamily. McDuff is
the son of a postal worker and his stay-at-home wife.
Cromp's parents are both social workers in Montreal's
poverty-stricken Pointe Saint-Charles neighbourhood.
Both teenagers are political activists -- Cromp, as
a card-carrying member of the Parti Québécois's
radical wing, McDuff as a sympathizer of the anti-globalization
movement.
To Cromp and McDuff, the Krocisms seemed disingenuous.
Instead of fostering teamwork, they felt managers often
pitted employees against one another. They felt it
was not the best workers who were promoted, but rather
the most obedient. The latter, the two say, were encouraged
to blow the whistle on co-workers who criticized managers.
The two young men thought things went from bad to
worse at the Peel Street outlet after franchisee Michel
Marchand brought in a new manager, Ismael Mejnaoui,
in early 2000. "He laid down the law," McDuff
says. "So we were forced to rush even more." By
the summer of 2000, the minimum wage had risen to $7.
McDuff was making $7.60 after two years on the job
and had climbed only a single rung to crew trainer.
Cromp, too, had moved up just a notch and was earning
$7.75. One evening, while waiting on a subway platform
after work, Cromp asked McDuff what he thought about
forming a union. Recalls McDuff: "We realized
we had nothing to lose."
In June, 2000, Cromp and McDuff sent an e-mail to
the Confédération des syndicats nationaux
(CSN), Quebec's second-largest trade-union central
and its most staunchly social democratic. Days later,
the two met with CSN organizers Henri van Meerbeck
and Kevin Schwankner. Both knew the fast-food industry
well. Van Meerbeck, 50, had successfully organized
dozens of restaurants, including several Kentucky Fried
Chickens and a McDonald's outlet in Saint-Hubert, Que.
-- which would have been a singular achievement, but
for the fact that the restaurant closed shortly afterward.
Schwankner, 36, joined the CSN after working 12 years
at a Harvey's in the Montreal suburb of Brossard. During
his stint there, the outlet was organized by the United
Food and Commercial Workers Union. Working conditions
improved dramatically. The union won the adoption of
a formal pay scale (with a starting salary pegged 35
cents above the minimum wage), with regular raises
and promotions based on seniority. Labour relations
and health and workplace safety committees were set
up with employee and management representatives. Employees
won the right to be accompanied by a union representative
in all their disciplinary dealings with management,
and a formal process for investigating grievances was
established. Managers were prohibited from cutting
employee hours without giving sufficient notice. Employees
working after 8 p.m. won an extra 30 cents an hour.
(It's not surprising that it is in Quebec that unions
have been most active in attempting to organize the
fast-food industry. The province remains Canada's most
union-friendly: 39.9% of Quebec workers belong to unions,
compared to a national average of 32%, and the province
has some of the farthest-reaching workforce regulations
on the continent.)
McDuff and Cromp liked what they heard and began talking
to their co-workers -- quietly, having been warned
by their CSN mentors of what could happen if McDonald's
management got wind of their scheme. McDonald's had
become legendary for dispatching a "flying squad" of
experienced officials to any restaurant where a union
incursion loomed. The task of these officials was to
warn employees of the pitfalls of unionization and
the benefits of keeping the McFamily united. Literally
hundreds of unionization attempts at outlets in North
America had been pre-empted this way in the past. "At
first, we knew not to mention the word 'union,'" remembers
McDuff. "Our first goal was simply to make employees
conscious of their working conditions."
On July 31, 2000, Cromp and McDuff were confident
a strong majority of employees felt as they did, and
proceeded to launch the critical sign-up drive. Time
was of the essence; they feared a failure to sign up
a majority of employees quickly would doom their initiative
as McDonald's swept in with its flying squad. Cromp
and McDuff worked feverishly over a 36-hour period
to meet individually with each employee. In the end,
about three-quarters signed union cards. "I knew
we were asking for trouble," says Patrick Bibeau,
now 19, a crew worker at the Peel outlet. "But
I was for it."
"Unions are inimical to what we stand for and
how we operate." - - former McDonald's Corp. labour
relations chief John Cooke
"If every single member of a crew in a particular
restaurant joined a union, (McDonald's) would still
not negotiate with the union." - - McDonald's
U.K. vice-president Sidney Nicholson
With $40 billion (U.S.) in worldwide sales, McDonald's
remains the globe's dominant restaurant chain and the
world's most recognized brand. More than 45 million
people -- including three million Canadians -- eat
at McDonald's on any given day. Last year, it served
16.5 billion (including repeat) customers. The company,
headquartered in Oak Brook, Ill., is the world's largest
owner of real estate (it typically makes most of its
profits as a landlord to its franchisees), the largest
U.S. purchaser of beef, pork and potatoes, the globe's
biggest operator of playgrounds. It employs 75,000
Canadians, half a million Americans. North American
teens depend on McDonald's more than any other single
organization for their first job.
McDonald's did not become so ubiquitous by being a
pushover. Kroc, who died in 1984, has often been depicted
as a despot. He forbade restaurants from hiring women
until a labour shortage forced him to relent in 1968.
Even then, Kroc insisted that female employees be "kind
of flat-chested" and devoid of distracting accoutrements
such as eye shadow or nail polish.
Kroc's successors, including current CEO Jack Greenberg,
have continued the tradition of central control through
the fastidious store inspections the company uses to
enforce operating disciplines, which are mind-bogglingly
extensive. The operations manual provided to franchisees
runs to more than 700 pages. The company's mantra,
QSC & V (a Krocism that stands for quality, service,
cleanliness and value) should have a "U" tacked
on for "uniformity." While some local menu
items are tolerated, franchisees undertake to ensure
that customers are treated to exactly the same experience
-- from the look, taste and "mouthfeel" of
the food to the speed with which it is served -- whether
they are in Montreal or Moscow, Boston or Bahrain.
Providing such uniform service leaves little leeway
for flexible working conditions. Were unions to significantly
infiltrate McDonald's operations, the company's ability
to dictate the conditions under which its restaurants
operate would be greatly reduced. Hence, McDonald's,
or at least its franchisees, have consistently fought
to keep unions out of their operations the world over.
In North America, they have a perfect track record
of rebuffing organized labour. Unions have made inroads
in continental Europe and Mexico. Even where unions
exist, the absence of closed-shop labour laws means
that usually only a minority of employees are covered.
In Russia, where Cohon opened the first McDonald's
in 1990 and where McDonald's of Canada continues to
jointly oversee operations, only 17 of 450 workers
belong to the union at McComplex, the food-processing
facility in Moscow. A committee of the State Duma,
citing alleged intimidation tactics used by McDonald's,
recently concluded it "violated the rights of
citizens to establish a labour union."
The company's antipathy toward organized labour came
under the microscope at London's so-called McLibel
trial in the mid-1990s. The company had sued Helen
Steel and Dave Morris, two Greenpeace activists, for
their part in distributing a pamphlet that delineated
a litany of alleged transgressions by McDonald's --
from animal and environmental abuse to selling unhealthy
food.
While the trial produced some startling revelations
-- McDonald's, it was learned, had infiltrated London
Greenpeace with paid informers in 1989 -- labour issues
provided perhaps the most sparks. The trial revealed
that, after an employee was fatally electrocuted by
a fat-filtering machine in 1992, a U.K. Health and
Safety Executive report concluded: "The application
of McDonald's hustle policy (i.e., getting staff to
work at speed) in many restaurants was, in fact, putting
the service of the customer before the safety of employees." McDonald's
U.K. acknowledged having been convicted of 73 offences
in relation to the employment of young people in the
early 1980s. McDonald's officials were questioned about
John Cooke, the company's U.S. labour relations head
in the 1970s, whose job it was to keep unions out.
Cooke's tactics, which had defeated some 400 unionization
attempts in the United States, included using flying
squads, "rap sessions" with employees and "stroking." Company
officials also admitted that in 1973, employees in
San Francisco had been asked to take polygraph tests
during a bitter union drive.
Judge Rodger Bell issued an 800-page ruling in February,
1996. Although he ordered Steel and Morris to pay McDonald's £60,000
in damages (later reduced to £40,000), the duo
came out looking like victors. McDonald's said it had
no intention of collecting the money and would no longer
try to quash the pamphlet. But the bad publicity from
the trial had taken its toll on the company's image.
And Judge Bell's ruling didn't help. Although Steel
and Morris failed to prove that McDonald's had a formal
policy of thwarting unionization, the judge found, "as
a fact," that McDonald's is "strongly antipathetic
to any idea of unionization of crew in their restaurants."
"A union at McDonald's would answer no need and
would only complicate things. It would be a fifth wheel...And
in an organization such as ours, if something is unnecessary
it's not a neutral presence. It's counterproductive." -
McDonald's of Canada senior chairman George Cohon
In Canada, McDonald's has denied any direct involvement
in fighting unionization, insisting such matters are
strictly between employees and their franchisee. "McDonald's
is not anti-union. McDonald's is pro-employee," one
official told The Globe and Mail in 1997. (McDonald's
Restaurants of Canada officials refused to be interviewed
for this article and, in recent years, have consistently
spurned all media requests for comments on the union
matter.)
Once a unionization effort is under way, time is the
union's greatest enemy. The longer a McDonald's franchisee
can prolong labour board hearings on an accreditation
request, the greater the odds the union drive will
fail. Workers grow weary, legal bills pile up for the
union, and annual employee turnover -- typically 75%
or more in the fast food industry -- dilutes the ranks
of union sympathizers.
The high turnover rate is attributable to a single
factor: More than two-thirds of fast food workers are
under 20. As Eric Schlosser notes in his recent book
Fast Food Nation, "Fast food kitchens often seem
like a scene from Bugsy Malone, a film in which all
the actors are children pretending to be adults. ...There's
nothing about the work in a fast food kitchen that
requires young employees. Instead of relying on a small,
stable, well-paid and well-trained workforce, the fast
food industry seeks out part-time, unskilled workers
who are willing to accept low pay. Teenagers have been
the perfect candidates for these jobs, not only because
they are less expensive to hire than adults, but also
because their youthful inexperience makes them easier
to control."
About a dozen unionization attempts have been launched
at McDonald's outlets in Canada in the past decade.
None has been a success in the long run. In recent
years, unions have organized a dozen Starbucks and
50 KFC outlets in British Columbia, and dozens more
Harvey's, Tim Hortons, KFC and St-Hubert BBQ Chicken
restaurants in Quebec. McDonald's remains the union
movement's toughest nut. Franchisees have made remarkably
similar responses to ensure it remains that way:
In 1993, the Service Employees International Union
signed up 67 of 102 employees at a McDonald's in Orangeville,
Ont. A week before the certification application was
filed, a McDonald's human relations specialist showed
up at the restaurant to "chat" with employees.
McDonald's said this was a coincidence. The franchisee,
Cam Ballantyne, fought the union bid during months
of hearings at the Ontario Labour Relations Board.
Formerly pro-union employees suddenly came forward
to withdraw their signatures; lawyers for others cited
the Age of Majority Act to claim they were too young
to unionize. The change-of-heart group, mostly minimum-wage
earners, did not say who paid their lawyer. Meanwhile,
Ballantyne treated anti-union employees to a tobogganing
party. He posted a notice on the staff bulletin board,
claiming wages at unionized fast food restaurants were
lower. After months of wrangling, the union agreed
to a new vote. It lost 77 to 19.
In 1997, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
signed up 51 of 62 employees at a McDonald's outlet
in St-Hubert, Que. The franchisees, Tom and Mike Capelli,
hired lawyers from Fasken Martineau Dumoulin, a major
national corporate law firm. New managers were recruited
from McDonald's of Canada to run the restaurant. The
Capellis' lawyers challenged the accreditation request
before a Quebec labour commissioner, claiming the union
needed to sign up a majority of workers at all six
of the brothers' McDonald's franchises. After hearings
held over several weeks, the commissioner rejected
the claim. Then, six anti-union employees hired their
own lawyer (they didn't say who paid him) to challenge
the impartiality of the commissioner. Quebec's Court
of Appeal rejected their claim. In early March, 1998,
the labour commissioner issued a final ruling certifying
the union. It was too late. Two weeks earlier, the
Capellis had suddenly closed down their restaurant.
Also in 1997, the Teamsters signed up 41 of 54 employees
at a McDonald's outlet in Montreal's Plateau Mont-Royal
neighbourhood. The franchisee, Laurent Vignola, also
argued -- unsuccessfully -- that the union needed to
sign up a majority of employees at all of his franchises.
Then, he hired about 40 new part-time employees, arguing
before the labour commission that the union no longer
had a majority of the outlet's employees behind it.
He lost on that point too. The hearings, however, hit
an impasse after weeks of arguments. Ultimately, the
Teamsters agreed to a new vote in early 1999, but by
then only 12 of the outlet's original 54 employees
remained. The union lost.
In 1998, the Canadian Auto Workers signed up a majority
of the 85 employees at a McDonald's restaurant in Squamish,
B.C. The franchisee, Paul Savage, hired 28 new employees
and went before the B.C. Labour Relations Board to
argue, unsuccessfully, that the new group should be
included in the vote. Then, a group of dissident employees
hired their own lawyer, and went before the board,
claiming that under the Infant Act they were ineligible
for union membership. They lost. The union was recognized
and sought to negotiate a first contract, but no progress
was made. Under B.C. law, an employer can ask for a
new vote if no contract has been signed within 10 months.
Savage sought a new vote in 1999. This time, the batch
of employees Savage hired the year before were included,
while many of the original pro-union employees had
left. Employees voted 45 to 26 to decertify.
"People are our one true thing. We succeed or
fail every day, in every restaurant, because of our
people." - McDonald's Corp. CEO Jack Greenberg,
April, 2000
"Simply put, we aspire to be the best employer
in each community around the world" - McDonald's
Corp. 2000 Annual Report
Patrick Bibeau worked the closing shift at the Peel
Street McDonald's on Aug. 2, 2000. The atmosphere was
tense. Earlier in the day, the union's request for
certification had been filed with the Quebec's Bureau
du Commissaire-général du Travail (labour
relations office). Bibeau and his pro-union cohorts
knew their bold gesture would not go unanswered by
franchisee Michel Marchand. But little did they anticipate
how swiftly and broadly their challenge would be met.
Just after 8 p.m., Marchand arrived at the outlet
with a new manager in tow. Anna Mancuso, who had earlier
managed Laurent Vignola's Plateau Mont-Royal restaurant
during its union bid, came to Peel Street directly
from McDonald's of Canada's regional headquarters --
even though franchisees are expressly forbidden from
hiring corporate employees. Marchand would later tell
labour commissioner Michel Denis that an "emergency" forced
him to bring in Mancuso. The latter, according to labour
board transcripts, was accompanied by an "adviser" from
McDonald's regional head office. Shortly after their
arrival, two dozen teenagers -- hired that very day
-- were brought by bus to the restaurant for their
orientation. Most would later tell the labour board
that they were contacted, interviewed and hired within
minutes by Marchand. None ended up working more than
a few hours a week. But their hiring boosted the payroll
at Peel Street to 69 non-management employees.
Within days, Marchand had hired new lawyers, led by
Benoît Turmel, the same Fasken Martineau solicitor
who had represented both the Capelli brothers and Laurent
Vignola in their battles against the Teamsters in St-Hubert
and Plateau Mont-Royal. Turmel sought to raise the
bar. He asked commissioner Denis to include the 24
newly-hired employees in the tally for the union vote
and to deem all four of Marchand's McDonald's franchises
as part of the bargaining unit. A positive verdict
on either motion would have put the pro-union employees
in the minority and doomed the certification bid.
While his lawyers led the legal battle, Marchand was
busy on other fronts. In September, he suspended McDuff
for a week for having "publicly tarnished" the
restaurant's image during a pro-union rally. During
the rally, McDuff denounced the "abuse" employees
had undergone since the union bid was tabled -- including
the suggestion that union dues would reach 40% of workers'
salaries instead of the typical 2.5%. After the rally,
Marchand posted a letter on the staff bulletin board: "I
take these accusations personally and they hurt....The
[pro-union] rally disappoints me. Acts like that perturb
our ability to serve our customers and work as a team." Marchand
warned employees not to become pawns in "a bigger
agenda for the CSN," and he ended by thanking
them for their support "in these difficult times." McDuff
and Cromp dismissed Marchand's appeal. But other employees
took it more seriously, especially since Marchand,
who had rarely visited the restaurant before the union
bid was tabled, seemed to be always at the outlet now,
gamefully chatting up employees. He also began treating
them to frequent outings. Cromp learned of one trip
to a local water park only after the group left without
him. It didn't matter; he, along with the other union
leaders, had been scheduled to work that day.
In November, barely a week before Denis was to table
a final ruling, lawyer Philippe Garceau and his associates
intervened to claim they had just been hired by a group
of five Peel Street employees to challenge the union
bid. He asked Denis to delay a ruling until he could
prepare a case. He refused to name the anti-union employees
or to disclose who paid his fees. In his Nov. 24 final
ruling, Denis dismissed Garceau's attempt to intervene
as yet another "stalling tactic."
Denis was even more scathing toward Marchand. The
sudden hiring of 24 new employees -- a number representing
more than half of the restaurant's workers before Aug.
2 -- "was a scheme to improperly inflate the number
of workers and thus deprive the [union] of its representative
character," Denis concluded. Denis noted that
in the month following the union's tabling of its certification
request, Marchand had hired a total of 32 new employees
at the Peel Street outlet but only seven new workers
at all three of his other franchises. He noted too
that one of the 24 employees hired on Aug. 2 had only
accompanied a friend and had not even filled out a
job application. "Either [Marchand] is remarkably
effective at rapidly recruiting personnel," Denis
observed drily, "or he acted precipitously to
counter the union organization." He ended his
ruling with these words: "The labour commissioner
hereby certifies le Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs
du McDo -CSN [the McDo Workers' Union-CSN]."
Overnight, McDuff, Cromp and their cohorts became
heroes in Quebec -- painted in the media as teenage
Davids triumphing over a corporate Goliath. The Peel
Street outlet became the only unionized McDonald's
in North America. Within days, however, Garceau appealed
to Quebec's Tribunal du Travail (an appellate tribunal
in labour relations cases) to have the certification
set aside on behalf of the dissident employees. He
argued that Denis was not impartial, had insulted him
and had failed to consider his clients' claim that
they had not paid a nominal $2 fee when signing their
union cards, a violation of Quebec's labour law. Almost
six months later, Judge Louis Morin rejected Garceau's
complaints, noting that Denis and his agents had led
an "exceptional" investigation to authenticate
the representative nature of the union. Judge Morin
found "quite normal, given the circumstances,
that [Denis] question the seriousness of [Garceau's]
intervention." Rather than insulting Garceau,
Denis was simply expressing his "exasperation" at
Garceau's refusal to name his clients and to appear
in person before Denis (he sent an articling student). "If
I had been in the commissioner's place," Judge
Morin concluded, "I wouldn't have been so patient."
Morin's decision, coming in May, was merely a moral
victory for the union. In late April, Marchand had
suddenly announced he would close the Peel Street outlet
by the end of the summer. His reason: a three-fold
rent increase. The union challenged Marchand's explanation,
noting that the Peel Street building's commercial value
had been recently reduced on city rolls to $1.6 million
from $2.3 million in 1995, a change apt to make rent
go down rather than up. Besides, the union argued,
the outlet was in the heart of downtown Montreal's
busiest office and shopping district -- the Sainte-Catherine
Street strip -- where business is the briskest it's
been in years. Nevertheless, on June 22, on the eve
of Quebec's St-Jean-Baptiste Day celebrations, Marchand
told employees the Peel Street outlet would close that
evening. With only a few hours notice, they were out
of a job. By the next morning, the golden arches and
other McDonald's signage that had adorned the building
for 25 years had been taken down.
"It seems as though McDonald's is becoming more
sophisticated with every organizing attempt," sighs
Sarah Inglis, who led the union bid in Orangeville
eight years ago and now works as an organizer for the
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International
Union in Toronto. "It would be unusual to see
the same type of tactics used by several individual
franchisees in different parts of the country unless
the umbrella body, McDonald's of Canada, was giving
them a helping hand." Roger Crowther, the CAW
national representative who organized the Squamish
McDonald's in 1998, agrees. While attempting to negotiate
a first contract, Crowther sat across from two lawyers
-- a rarity, he says, in his 25-year union career. "Here's
this franchisee who's telling me he can't pay more
than the minimum wage but who has not one, but two,
full-time lawyers." Adds Edward Kravitz, the CSN
lawyer who led the Peel union's case before the labour
board: "If it walks like a duck, has web feet
and quacks, it's probably a duck." But even Kravitz
concedes it's almost impossible to prove McDonald's
unbroken success in beating back unions in North America
is a formal company policy, orchestrated and bankrolled
by head office.
The thing about McDonald's and unions, though, is
that for every organization bid that fails, another
is born. In April this year, workers at the McDonald's
outlet in Rawdon, Que., a resort town of about 9,000
northeast of Montreal, were granted union certification
after the franchisee suddenly sold his restaurant.
The new owner agreed to talk to the union. But the
CSN is not holding its breath. McDonald's franchisees
have a track record as tough negotiators. Under Quebec
labour law, the Rawdon franchisee, Sylvain Vincent,
can seek a decertification vote next spring if no contract
has been signed. That is, if the outlet is still open
by then. CSN negotiator Jean Archambault worries Vincent
might simply shut the place once the tourist season
is over.
If the outlet does close, it, like the Peel Street
restaurant, will be an anomaly. In 1999 and 2000, McDonald's
says, "less than 1% of existing restaurant locations
closed" in Canada. What's more, it plans to open
300 new Canadian outlets within three years, buttressing
this country's status as McDonald's biggest market
after the United States and Japan.
As for McDuff and Cromp, they, like all the teenage
veterans of the union war, have moved on. McDuff will
study political science at the Université de
Montréal this fall, while working part-time
at a community radio station. He wants to become a
journalist one day. Cromp, meanwhile, has loftier ambitions.
When not training at the track -- his personal best
is 10.8 seconds in the 100 metres -- he dreams of eventually
becoming premier of Quebec. As Ray Kroc would have
said, press on, boys, press on.
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